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Feeling Animal: 
Pet-Making and Mastery in the 
Slave’s Friend
Abolitionist Sentiment and the Animal Metaphor
In 1835, the American Anti-Slavery Society planned a series of periodicals in-
tended to extend the reach of the abolitionist message throughout the nation.1 
One of these was a juvenile reader, the Slave’s Friend, which ran from 1836 to 
1839. A single-signature, sixteen-page monthly, published by the New York An-
ti-Slavery Society, the Slave’s Friend was edited by New York abolitionist Lewis 
Tappan and printed by R. G. Williams.2 The editor placed great hopes in the 
power of children to create change. In one vignette, he describes this episode:
A few months ago, two gentlemen were traveling in a stage coach. 
One was a slaveholder and the other an abolitionist. The abolitionist 
gave the slaveholder some anti-slavery pamphlets to read. One of 
them was a Slave’s Friend. The slaveholder turned over the leaves, 
looked at the pictures, and read some of the stories. He then said, 
“Now I begin to fear. If you make children abolitionists slavery must 
come to an end.”3
The editor goes on to declare that “slavery will come to an end if the children 
read, talk, and act about it,” suggesting that children “may have some influence 
with your parents, and persons who are older than you.” And in a list of “a few 
things that you can do,” he admonishes children to “be very kind to colored 
people. Treat them as well as you do white people. Above all, pray for colored 
people, whether bond or free.”4 Kindness and prayers were intended to create 
a sense of sympathy for the slave in the middle-class child readers of the tract. 
The tract also included numerous representations of children with animals 
and allegorical vignettes featuring animals, which provided another model of 
kindness and the moral exercise of power for the periodical’s child readers.
The ethical equation between slavery and animal cruelty was common 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century representations of slavery. Slaveholders 
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deployed a dehumanizing metaphor in describing slaves as brutes, and under 
chattel slavery—which involves the outright ownership of slaves and their pos-
terity and was historically often racially based—slaves were reduced to living 
property, in legal status little more than animals. As Markman Ellis describes 
it, “Slaves, like animals, were degraded to the status of things, considered as 
property, and as such, not human—or at least, not human in the same way 
as the master.”5 Later, as Stephen Michael Best points out, in response to abo-
litionist challenges, “Slavery’s apologists narrowed their claims to property 
rights in slaves to a claim to their labor, and a right to labor for the most part 
warranted a further right to obedience.”6 This logic, according to Joanne Pope 
Melish, “alienated the enslaved from their humanness along with their free-
dom” because, as property, the enslaved “had value only in relation to owner-
ship, use, and exchange by persons,” and under the law the ontological status 
of the enslaved was defined as property, and a slave’s existence had meaning 
only when owned, used, and exchanged.7
Animal imagery is ubiquitous in abolitionist writing, in general, but is 
particularly prevalent in texts marketed to children. Abolitionists, who drew a 
moral equivalency between the torture of animals and the abuse of slaves by 
their masters, also used animal metaphors in describing slaves. Slave children 
in particular were described using animal metaphors, and both domesticated 
pets and wild animals often appeared as allegorical figures in abolitionist lit-
erature, representing slaves and free blacks. These allegorical animals were 
deployed in an attempt to create sympathy for the enslaved, suggesting that 
the feelings produced by witnessing representations of animal suffering, and 
from observing animals’ behavior toward humans, could stimulate sympathies 
that would lead to abolitionist sentiment. This practice exploited a continuum 
of anti-cruelty thought that, while creating sympathetic identification with both 
the suffering slave and the suffering animal, dehumanized slaves by placing 
them metaphorically in the same status as animals. Allegories of pet-making 
in abolitionist writing provided white children with a model for negotiating 
their relationship with free blacks and for asserting their class-entitled mastery 
in general.
Children were perceived both as particularly vulnerable to the depreda-
tions of slavery and as particularly effective advocates for its abolition. Con-
current with the trend of depicting children as victims of slavery, bourgeois 
white children from the 1830s forward were increasingly the desired audience 
for abolitionist writing. This targeting of children resulted from a dual valence 
in sentimental culture. On the one hand, abolitionist authors found writing for 
children to be a safer way to engage in public-sphere political discourse than 
other genres or media because the moral education of children fell within the 
bounds of the domestic sphere, and thus children’s literature existed in an in-
terstitial zone between the literary public sphere and the domestic. Secondly, 
as Deborah De Rosa has argued, children, and in particular boys, represented 
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a second wave assault on the institution of slavery, an interpretation which 
suggests that, should these authors fail to influence adults to effect political 
change, the rising generation of boys were the next best hope of reformers, abo-
litionists, and educationalists to see their vision enacted in the public sphere.8 
Abolitionist periodicals carried a heterogeneous blend of content, mixing pro-
to-journalistic essays with polemical prose, along with a variety of poetry, in-
cluding verse intended for children. Pamphlets and periodicals specifically for 
children also proliferated in the antebellum print marketplace. 
More than 250,000 copies of the Slave’s Friend were produced in the years 
of its run. The magazine was available by subscription and sold both singly 
and in bulk—one cent per issue, ten cents the dozen, eighty cents the hundred, 
and a thousand for $6.50. As with other tracts, readers were intended to pass 
them on or leave them in public places, and copies were also distributed free 
through the mails with the intent that some would find their way to children 
in the South. Christopher Geist points out that those periodicals shipped to 
the South were unlikely to reach readers since postmasters commonly rejected 
materials they deemed “incendiary”; one of the first shipments to reach South 
Carolina was seized and destroyed.9 
Among recent engagments with the Slave’s Friend, DeRosa connects the pe-
riodical to the foundation of juvenile anti-slavery societies, while Lesley Gins-
berg relates figurations of girls with domestic animals in the Slave’s Friend to 
discourses of citizenship in antebellum America.10 Holly Keller acknowledges 
the influence that juvenile abolitionist literature, and the Slave’s Friend in par-
ticular, had on Harriet Beecher Stowe in crafting her master work, noting that 
“in many ways [Uncle Tom’s Cabin] was a summation of the methods and ar-
guments developed in adult and juvenile antislavery texts before 1850.”11 Fol-
lowing Caroline Levander’s assertion that “the child operates as a rich vehicle 
for constituting U.S. national identity through the idea of racial purity,” in this 
essay I argue that representations of animals in the Slave’s Friend participate in 
a metaphorical strategy which produced a problematic discourse of pet-making 
that protected the class status and racial identity of white children exposed to 
abolitionist writing. Before turning to the Slave’s Friend, it is worth stepping 
back to examine the discourse of pet-making from which these metaphorical 
associations draw power and to look briefly at the discourse of animal cruelty 
that informs much abolitionist poetry for children.
The Making of Pets
In Dominance and Affection, an influential and controversial analysis of 
pet-making, philosopher Yi Fu Tuan argues that the affection that produces the 
pet-making impulse is based in a compulsion to dominate the creature that is 
the object of human affection. According to Tuan:
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affection is not the opposite of dominance; rather it is dominance’s 
anodyne—it is dominance with a human face. Dominance may be 
cruel and exploitative, with no hint of affection in it. What it produces 
is the victim. On the other hand, dominance may be combined with 
affection, and what it produces is the pet.12
For Tuan, pet-making is an exercise in power which compels its object—wheth-
er animal or plant, slave or child—to conform to specific behavioral standards 
in order to receive affectionate attention and material support from its master. 
In Tuan’s formulation, power operates to reduce animate creatures to the status 
of mechanical things. From the control of human labor by mechanical clocks to 
the regulation of animal behavior in the service of agriculture or blood sports, 
the natural is subsumed to the will of power elites who benefit from their 
dominance of both men and animals. 
In the animaculture of nineteenth-century America, the making of pets 
involved the operation of a sentimental displacement of human affection away 
from human objects within the family and toward domesticated animals. Ac-
cording to Tuan, human affection became more difficult to articulate as “modern 
society . . . began to segment and isolate people into their private spheres.”13 
Pets largely do not provide a service in the household but rather fulfill aesthet-
ic and emotional needs for their masters. (The benefit to the pet is arguable.)14 
Cats and dogs that serve as mousers and ratters sometimes blur this distinction, 
but more often a household in which animals are kept for these purposes will 
also include house pets not used for labor. The services provided by mousers 
and ratters connect them in the minds of their nominal owners to the feral origin 
of their species, and the killing of vermin causes them to be perceived as unsani-
tary. They are excluded from the domestic sphere as “outside dogs” or “barn 
cats,” though sporting dogs used for hunting can be exceptions to this rule.
Tuan likens the process of domestication to the arts of topiary or bonsai, 
in which plants are transformed through meticulous husbandry into unnatu-
ral shapes. The sentimental aestheticization of the pet has produced an array 
of morphological changes in the species to which humans have become most 
attached—from toy breeds of dogs, some of which are unable to give birth 
without caesarian section, to hairless cats and the endless varieties of goldfish, 
the operation of power has been inscribed onto the bodies of these animals. 
Generations of pet-loving critics, who also love the image of themselves as 
loving their pets, have reacted strongly to Tuan’s formulation. Erica Fudge, 
who describes Tuan’s thesis as “uncomfortable,” declares that “pet ownership 
is premised on the notion that it is possible to extend one’s capacity to love 
beyond the limits of species; that one can have a truly affectionate and mean-
ingful relationship with a being that is not human.”15 Tuan allows for the role 
of love in the human-pet relationship but contends that love masks the violence 
inherent in the process of creating the “docile and friendly pet.”16
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There seems to be an almost instinctive rejection of Tuan’s logic on the part 
of pet owners, though the vehemence of the rejection, and the forms it takes, 
seem to reinforce his point. Clare Palmer points out that “discomfort with the 
traditional word ‘pet’” has resulted in the adoption of the term “companion 
animals” for pets and the use of “guardian” instead of “owner” in modern legal 
and social usage: “Animals are to be regarded as companions, not as beings 
to whom we condescend.”17 More radically, Donna Haraway has proposed a 
model for interaction with companion species (she is particularly concerned 
with dogs) based on what she describes as “significant otherness,” in which 
she claims that the human-dog relationship is based on co-evolution and mu-
tual agency.18 In describing her relationship with her dog, Ms Cayenne Pep-
per, Haraway exults in the difference and transgression she perceives between 
companion species:
We have had forbidden conversation; we have had oral intercourse; 
we are bound in telling story on story with nothing but the facts. We 
are training each other in acts of communication we barely under-
stand. We are, constitutively, companion species. We make each other 
up, in the flesh. Significantly other to each other, in species difference, 
we signify in the flesh a nasty developmental infection called love. 
This love is a historical aberration and a naturalcultural legacy.19
But by devolving the relationship to love, an anthropomorphizing slip which 
seems quite deliberate, Haraway reinscribes the old pet-making paradigm. For, 
after all, what do we love when we say we love our pets? Certainly we have 
affection for the animal itself, but do we not also love the sensation of domi-
nance, the feeling of power over another living being? I would contend, with 
Tuan, that these linguistic turns, however jubilant and sophisticated, are simply 
continued attempts to efface the psychic and physical violence that inhere in 
the pet-making process.
Following John Locke’s admonition that caring for pets “taught diligence 
and good nature,”20 pet keeping was thought, in the nineteenth century, to be 
beneficial to children, and it offered certain parallels with ideas of child de-
velopment. In being made a pet, the indoor animal becomes what Lori Merish 
describes as the “bestial (domestic) Other” which, through its “sentimental 
erotic appeal—its ‘cuteness’” inspires affectionate devotion and, through its 
vulnerability and its capacity for suffering, teaches the limits of domestic pow-
er.21 Children learn to be kind by observing their companion animals’ capacity 
for suffering and dependence. The editor of the Slave’s Friend declared to his 
readers that “a good boy, who is kind even to a dog, will, when he becomes a 
man, be kind to every being,” implying that the lessons derived from interact-
ing with animals could then be transferred metaphorically to other Others—
based on race or class—with whom the children might interact. According to 
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Jennifer Mason, “individuals’ everyday encounters with nonhuman life could 
offer valuable moral lessons and cultivate the virtues—such as discipline and 
benevolence—valued by the middle class,” and “companion animals—and es-
pecially the dog—exhibited the qualities parents wished to inculcate in their 
children.”22 However, as Sianne Ngai has argued, cuteness—with its implica-
tions of “smallness, compactness, simplicity and pliancy—call[s] forth specific 
affects: helplessness, pitifulness, and even despondency” and also inspires con-
flicting impulses of “ugly or aggressive feelings, as well as the expected tender 
or maternal ones.”23 The vulnerability to power implicit in the infantilized state 
of the pet invites by its very softness and malleability the improper exercise of 
power. Sentimental reformers, including but not limited to abolitionists, rec-
ognized this impulse, particularly in boys, and worked to educate against it.
Children and Their Animals
The presence of animals in writing for children and the use of animal 
allegories to represent a discourse of mastery and to describe appropriate be-
havior for children toward subordinates are as old as Æsop. As Seth Lerer 
describes, Roman children were given beast fables as allegories of mastery as 
part of their earliest initiation into literacy. Beast fables are arguably the old-
est genre of literature for children, and children’s literature continued to draw 
from this tradition well into the modern era and continues to do so today.24 
Throughout the eighteenth century, even as naturalists were providing increas-
ingly scientific explanations of animal anatomy and behavior, animals retained 
their allegorical signification, and fables remained popular. The eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries saw numerous editions of Æsop’s fables printed in Eng-
land and America, and the fables were “a staple of the Latin grammar school 
curriculum,” both in Latin and in bilingual editions.25 Beast fables were also 
taught to African American children. According to Jennifer Monaghan, Mrs. 
Ayres, an instructor at the Negro Charity School in Philadelphia in the 1760s, 
included Æsop’s fables along with a speller and the New Testament on her 
curriculum.26
The boundary between humans and animals is central to the problem of 
the ethical treatment of animals. The biblical doctrine of dominion, defined in 
Genesis 1:26, has been argued by some to justify the exploitation of animals 
and the natural world in general.27 For Descartes, the ability to reason and the 
capacity for speech are indicators that humans possess a soul, while animals 
are beast-machines, unfeeling automata.28 Earlier, Montaigne had reasoned the 
opposite, declaring that animals indeed had souls and arguing for their care. 
As historian Linda Kalof describes it, Montaigne “not only considered animals 
no more ‘brutish’ than humans, but also as participants in cross-species com-
munication and capable of acts of kindness and reciprocity.” His view would 
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be overwhelmed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the Cartesian 
model took hold and animals became objectified by the Enlightenment’s new 
experimental science, which demanded vivisection of live animals, a practice 
justified by Cartesian ideas that animals did not feel pain.29
But not everyone accepted the idea that animals were without sensation, 
and violence perpetrated by children toward animals became a preoccupation 
of many reformers from the late seventeenth century on. In Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, John Locke emphasized the importance of preventing 
children from tormenting animals: “For the custom of tormenting and killing of 
beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men.”30 Eighteenth-
century reformers like Jeremy Bentham attempted to make moot the question 
of reason in relation to the ethics of animal cruelty: “The question is not, Can 
they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law 
refuse its protection to any sensitive being?”31 Bentham included slaves in this 
equation, and abolitionists deployed this argument to sidestep racialist claims 
about the inhumanity of slaves in favor of an ethical position based on the 
ability of the slave to articulate suffering, creating an ethical continuum that 
included both animals and slaves. As historian Elizabeth Clark points out, “the 
story of the suffering slave” became a central trope of abolitionist literature and 
“in the 1830s began to play a crucial role in an unfolding language of individu-
al rights.”32 Concern for animals was the norm in reformist works, but a type of 
paternalism marked much animal welfare discourse, enacting the ethical posi-
tions of Locke and Bentham but still bearing the marks of Cartesian hierarchies 
of being and the Biblical discourse of dominion. Though generally reinforcing 
a benevolent attitude toward animal nature, representations of children and 
animals together make it clear that this relationship is hierarchical; within this 
hierarchy, children fall somewhere between animals and adult humans. While 
simultaneously teaching both obedience to adults and dominance over ani-
mals, this liminal status also allows children themselves to be treated as pets.
If it seems startling that children should be regarded as pets, it is worth 
looking at the origins of the term and the way it has been applied to children 
historically to see how this notion has been naturalized. In Why the Wild Things 
Are, her analysis of animals in the lives of twenty-first-century children, Gail S. 
Melson declares, “The association of children and pets has strong historical and 
intellectual underpinnings,” and she observes that, etymologically, “the term 
‘pet’ itself first applied to the indulged, spoiled child,” suggesting a relation-
ship between the status of pets and the status of children in the household.33 
According to the OED, it was only in the sixteenth century that “pet” began 
to apply to favorite domesticated creatures and small farm animals. Indeed, it 
appears that small domestic animals’ similarity to children in both status and 
affect prompted the shift in the word’s association, and some of the citations 
provided by the OED demonstrate the persistence of this notion, like the ex-
ample from John MacTaggart’s 1824 Scottish Gallovidian Encyclopedia: “A pet is 
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always a dangerous creature; thus a child, petted by its parents, plays the devil 
some day in the world; a sheep petted, is apt to turn a duncher.”34 Tuan argues 
that “the small child is a piece of wild nature that must be subdued and then 
played with—transformed into cute, cuddly, beings or miniature adults as the 
mother or the surrogate mother sees fit.” For Tuan, pet-making is inherent 
in the process of parenting, for power over a child “is not quite perceived as 
power over another fully human individual. The child, in other words, is a pet 
and is properly treated as such.”35
That the petted child could “play the devil” was a preoccupation in the 
world of conduct fiction, which made a particular obsession of the perceived 
caprice, cruelty, and violence of young boys. In the anonymous sketch “Cru-
elty to Animals; or The Boys and the Squirrel” from New Haven printer S. 
Babcock’s 1841 collection Instruction and Amusement for the Young, a “beauti-
ful little squirrel” is attacked by a group of boys, mutilated with a knife, and 
thrown to dogs, who dismember the smaller animal. “Perhaps there is no vice 
to which some boys are so much addicted, as cruelty to the brute creation; they 
seem to think that because animals can not speak, they can not feel pain,” ago-
nizes the narrator, who claims that, because of his “humane parents, I never 
shared in such cruel sports, [but] I could not avoid witnessing the cruelty of 
other boys.”36 The narrator attempts to create a sense of sentimental reciprocity 
with the tortured animal, invoking the trope of motherhood and abandoned 
children familiar from sentimental fiction and slave narratives to stir feeling 
in his readers, speculating that “perhaps it might have been a mother, and its 
little ones died of starvation.”37 Child readers are asked to consider the conse-
quences of their actions in terms of the disruption to the animal family, a trope 
that echoes back and forth between conduct manuals for children and juvenile 
abolitionist literature.
The Young Emancipators
Targeted to children as young as two, the Slave’s Friend contains many ref-
erences to adults reading the tract to pre-literate children and to toddlers cry-
ing out “I am an abolitionist!”38 in response to their parents’ earnest inquiries. 
It also includes numerous graphic representations of violence against slaves 
along with iconic illustrations of the tools of slavery, including whips and re-
straints. One chilling image that recurs in the Slave’s Friend is a Bowie knife 
engraved with the motto: “Death to Abolitionists.”39 Readers are cautioned that 
those knives are available in New York City, implying that their support for 
abolition put them in physical danger, even in the North. This tactic is designed 
to create a feeling of sentimental reciprocity between the white Northern child 
and the slave child by implying that slavery exposes both groups of children 
to bodily harm. But, curiously, the Slave’s Friend rarely represents white and 
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black children interacting. In those rare instances in which these interactions 
are depicted, the white child is shown acting paternalistically toward the black 
child, as in Figure 1, in which a white girl, Charlotte, is shown teaching Peggy, 
a black girl, to read while a small dog looks on attentively. (The cross-hatching 
in the engraving of the dog indicates that it is lighter in color than the black 
child in the center of the tableau.) This tableau dramatizes the hierarchy of pets 
and children of different races. Peggy, the black child, is surrounded by the 
embracing arms of the white girl, who helps support the book with one hand 
and rests the other on Peggy’s shoulder. Peggy’s body is framed and contained 
by the dog, the book, and Charlotte’s controlling embrace. The dog, in contrast, 
is unencumbered even by a collar. The dog’s gaze is fixed upon the face of the 
black girl, as though monitoring her progress, mirroring Charlotte’s gaze as she 
helps Peggy to read. Peggy is both literally and figuratively between the dog 
and the white child, physically restrained by their bodies and between them 
in status, not fully a pet, but not equal to Charlotte.
In lieu of representations of black and white children together, the Slave’s 
Friend offers many examples of sympathetic reciprocity between white children 
and a variety of animals—from butterflies to puppies. I contend that animals 
FIgUre 1. Slave’s Friend 2, no.10 (1837). Private 
Collection.
130  American Periodicals
serve as proxies for freed slave children in the Slave’s Friend, and white chil-
dren’s interactions with these animals, carried out under the loving, admoni-
tory gazes of their like-minded parents, not only model behaviors based in the 
“law of human kindness,” advocated by Catherine Beecher and other reform-
ers, but also provide examples of benevolent mastery which the child readers 
of the Slave’s Friend were intended to emulate in their interactions with animals 
and with free blacks (and, in particular, free black children).40 Little girls appear 
in the pages of the Slave’s Friend performing an idealized role in the liberation 
of non-working animals like butterflies or birds. Critical engagement with the 
pamphlet has tended to focus on the girl children, perhaps in part because 
these representations fit easily into a discourse of citizenship and emancipation 
that is the standard interpretation of abolitionist literature.41 But, in keeping 
with the examples we have seen from conduct literature, little white boys are 
objects of particular scrutiny in the Slave’s Friend and outnumber girls as the 
objects of address or as characters or speakers in the poetry at a ratio of nearly 
two to one. This compulsion to interpolate and discipline bourgeois white boys 
results at least in part from the residual influence of eighteenth-century concep-
tions of the caprice and violence of boyhood.
Abolitionist writing deploys the ambivalent dog as a frequent trope for an 
idealized interaction with freed slaves. For example, this little didactic rhyme 
from the Slave’s Friend explicitly echoes the Lockean formulation of animal 
abuse: 
A boy who is cruel to a dumb animal will be so to another boy; and 
a cruel boy generally becomes a cruel man. While a good boy, who 
is kind even to a dog, will, when he becomes a man, be kind to ev-
ery being.
I’ll never hurt a little dog,
But stroke and pat his head;
I like to see him wag his tail,
I like to see him fed.
Then I will never beat my dog,
Nor will I give him pain;
Poor fellow! I will give him food,
And he’ll love me again.42
While the introductory stanza implies the gender—male—of the speaker 
of the poem, the first person perspective of the poem compels the child read-
er to ventriloquize the speaker, performing the poem rather like a Sunday 
School recitation. The child reader is required to recite the pledge that opens 
the poem and, further, to imagine that he not only loves his dog but also may 
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have already injured his pet. For what is curious here is that the cruelty the 
boy speaker seems to be refuting seems already to have taken place—why else 
would there be the need for coerced forgiveness in the final line? It would ap-
pear that the boy, having erred by hurting his dog, now understands (perhaps 
from his reading in the Slave’s Friend) how to properly exercise control over his 
pet without recourse to violence. But it is only through a system of rewards—
food and physical affection—that the sentimental economy of reciprocation is 
maintained. Reading the poem allegorically, then, which the published con-
text invites us to do, allows us to see that both animal cruelty and the abuse 
of slaves constitute a misuse of a master’s power, which should be amended 
through demonstrations of affection. The goal is to raise children, and espe-
cially boys, who are “kind to every being,” dogs and slaves alike. 
Another dog poem from the Slave’s Friend negotiates this relationship a 
little differently. Rather than affection and reward, the dog here seems naturally 
inclined to obedience and service: 
Behold the Dog! so good to guard
His master’s cottage, house or yard,—
Dishonest men away to keep,
And guard us safely when we sleep.
For, if at midnight, still and dark,
Strange steps he hears, with angry bark
He bids his master wake and see,
If thieves or honest folks they be.
At home, abroad, obedient still,
His only guide his master’s will;
Before his steps or by his side,
He runs or walks, with joy and pride.
He runs to fetch the stick or ball,
Returns obedient to the call;
Content and pleas’d, if he but gains
A single pat for all his pains.43
The dog knows his place, voiceless and grateful, at his master’s side. 
When danger threatens the household, he serves solely as the alarm and lacks 
the capacity to interpret the threat; that requires the master to “wake and see, 
/ If thieves or honest folks they be.” The “master’s will” provides the dog’s 
“only guide” for interpreting and interacting with influences from outside the 
household. The master provides guidance and a sort of condescending affec-
tion, offering “a single pat” as reward to the dog, who receives it “with joy 
and pride” and remains “content and pleas’d,” despite “all his pains.” Though 
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the child reader is interpolated with the apostrophic “Behold the Dog!” of the 
first line, in the final line of that verse, the first person plural “us” again allows 
the reader to identify with the voice of the speaker and, subsequently, with 
the master introduced in the second verse. The child is permitted to identify 
not with the obedient dog but with the paternalistic master, whose conduct 
provides a model of distant, benevolent power, exercised with restraint. Again, 
given the context of the poems, an allegorical reading in which the dog is the 
stand in for the slave—and in this case the freed slave—seems to be invited. 
Representations of wild animals offer a different affective dynamic be-
tween humans and animals from those of domestic animals but one that man-
ages agency on the part of the freed slave in a strikingly different way than 
the paternalistic pet making discourse of the dog poems. “The Hedgehog” by 
Mary Howitt first appeared in Lydia Maria Child’s National Anti-Slavery Stan-
dard in May 1841.44 Child prefaces the poem with a tidy encapsulation of the 
evangelical project of sentimentalism:
Anything which excites the tenderness of the human heart, and di-
rects it toward heartless customs and cruel prejudices is doing the 
work of a missionary in the world’s redemption, though it be in the 
forms of a little child like poem. Who can estimate the blessed in-
fluence of Mary Howitt on future generations! The small seeds she 
plants with such living diligence, will grow into spreading trees and 
nations rest in their shade. Hear her pleas for the persecuted Hedge 
hog.45
Child’s description of the poem as “child like” signals its audience—the chil-
dren of readers of the National Anti-Slavery Standard—and provides a guidepost 
for identifying the genre of this particular lyric. 
The hedgehog is not a native of North America, but it would have been 
recognizable to American readers from natural history compendia like Alexan-
der Anderson’s 1804 New York reprint of Thomas Bewick’s A General History 
of Quadrupeds and from English sporting prints and paintings popular in the 
nineteenth century. This school of painting is exemplified by Scottish painter 
Edwin Landseer, known for his anthropomorphic portraits of dogs in “ani-
mated scenes of devotion and heroism.”46 Landseer’s Portrait of a Terrier (1828), 
commissioned by Owen Williams, the dog’s owner, is a bold, iconic image in 
which the startlingly white body of the terrier fills the center of the canvas, 
visually dominating the hedgehog, a tiny ball of dark quills cowering in a 
prickly clump, seemingly desperate to disappear under the nearby overhang 
of rock. The portrait was exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1828 but did not 
otherwise circulate in the nineteenth century.47 The animals’ pose, though, is a 
stock hunting tableau, evidenced by an 1838 woodcut from Parley’s Magazine 
illustrating the fable of “The Disobedient Hedgehog,” which echoes the tableau 
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in the Landseer painting.48 Hedgehogs also turn up in a surprising number of 
stories and articles in American periodicals, including natural history articles 
declaring the hedgehog to be a periapt against poisons, as well as fables and 
poems for children. Howitt’s poem inverts the sentimental object of the Land-
seer painting, offering up the oppressed hedgehog rather than the valiant dog 
for our sympathy. (See Figure 2.)
The apostrophe in the first half of poem is directed not at the reader, but 
at the English Porcupine: “Thou art a creature meek and mild, / and would’st 
not harm a sleeping child.” Even in these opening lines, there is something 
strange at work in the description of the hedgehog, which is a tiny creature and 
probably could’st not harm a sleeping child. The poem goes on to describe the 
hedgehog’s “foes,” “the urchin rabble” who pursue the creature with “terrier 
curs to hunt thee out.” These lines vividly and deliberately recall the scenes 
so common in slave narratives of runaways being hunted by packs of dogs. 
(Later, Stowe’s Dred would include a particularly gruesome scene of a slave 
FIgUre 2. edwin Landseer, Portrait of a Terrier, The Property of Owen Williams, ESQ., MP (Jocko with 
a Hedgehog), 1828. Oil on canvas. Milwaukee Art Museum, gift of erwin C. Uihlein. http://www.
mam.org. Used with permission.
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hunter bragging about the efficacy of his pack in such hunts.49) Again, an echo 
of the Lockean formula of childhood cruelty producing adult atrocity is no 
doubt present here, suggesting that the “urchin rabble” have the potential to 
commit greater evils as adults if they are allowed to persecute the hedgehog.
As the object of address shifts from the hedgehog to the reader, interpol-
lated here through the first person plural point of view, this paternalism be-
comes clearer: 
How hard it must be to be kicked about
If by a chance his prickly back peep out;
To be all his days misunderstood,
When he could not harm us if he would!
“When he could not harm us if he would!” This insistence on the harmlessness 
and lack of agency of the hedgehog makes reasonable sense if we are discuss-
ing a tiny echinoderm. But, by 1841, knowledge of the slave revolts in the 
South, most notably Nat Turner’s rebellion of 1831, and of the bloody revolu-
tion in Haiti was universal and along with it the knowledge that sometimes 
slaves could harm “us” when and if they would. Depicting the slave—via the 
metaphor of the lowly hedgehog—as without agency in this context, while 
designed rhetorically and aesthetically to excite the tenderness of the heart of 
the sentimental reader, also walks a similar ethical tightrope to that of the dog 
poems. But while the dog poems suggest a means of peaceful coexistence that 
maintains the mastery of the white child, the hedgehog neither invites nor in-
spires the pet-making impulse:
 . . . all he needs
Lies under the hedge, among the weeds.
He robs not man of rest nor food
And all that he asks is quietude;
To be left by him as a worthless stone,
Under the dry hedge bank alone!
Howitt’s poem, with its insistence that the animal stand-in for the slave 
desires only to be left alone, may undo some of the paternalistic discourse of 
the dog poems, but, with its denial of agency on the part of the animal, and the 
declaration of the animal’s worthlessness, it may align the poem more closely 
with the Colonization abolitionists who sought to return freed slaves en masse 
to Africa. The animal metaphor in Howitt’s poem allows the ambivalence of 
the relationship between the white child reader and the imagined free slave to 
go unresolved through its insistence on the helplessness and isolation of the 
animal that stands in for the oppressed.
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Educationalist Eliza Lee Follen’s poem “The Slave Boy’s Wish” (1845), 
which appeared in her collection Hymns and Songs for Young People, uses the 
animal metaphor in a strikingly different way, portraying a slave child imag-
ining himself transformed into animals and natural things (a cloud, a brook, 
a deer) as a strategy of resistance to his servitude. Structurally, the poem fol-
lows conventions that would have been familiar to any nineteenth-century 
child reader, featuring first person point-of-view and hymnal meter (8–6–8), a 
mnemonic metric scheme that is naturally catchy and easily sung (and was a 
favorite of both William Blake and Emily Dickinson, as well as many writers 
of children’s verse). The first person point-of-view is provocative, compelling, 
as it does, the white child reader to speak in the voice of the slave child.
Each of the imagined transmogrifications has agency: the bird sings and 
flies, the brook “runs so swift along,” the “wild, wild deer” flies “swifter than 
an arrow . . . / Through the forest far away.” It is easy to imagine a child reader 
being caught up in the imaginative embrace of the poem, which makes what 
follows all the more startling. The tone shifts abruptly in the last three verses 
when the speaker declares:
I’d rather be a cunning fox, 
 And hide me in a cave;
I’d rather be a savage wolf,
 Than what I am—a slave.
The flat declarative line is leaden after the lighter, imaginative verse of 
the preceding stanzas. The boy goes on to declare all virtues null and void in 
the face of his enslavement and sees death as his only hope for emancipation 
and religious salvation: “My Heavenly Father, let me die, / For then I shall be 
free.” This is potent rhetoric in a deceptively simple package that relies on what 
Marcus Wood describes as “the visionary qualities of the childish imagination” 
to create a sympathetic response in Follen’s reader.50 In “The Slave Boy’s Wish,” 
the animal metaphor is deployed to allow the slave access to agency—even to 
cunning and savagery—and acts as an antidote to the discourse of pet-making 
and denial of agency in the other poems. Child readers of Follen’s poem are 
invited, through the first person narration, to directly identify with the slave 
child, at last fully realizing the equation of sentimental reciprocity. 
In these images and poems, both pet-making and emancipation become 
lessons in the proper exercise of white power and class privilege. By training 
the child’s responses to both domesticated and wild animals, these poems cast 
the abolitionist child in the paternalistic role of steward, both of their compan-
ion animals and of the free blacks for whom these creatures stand in. Both ani-
mal cruelty and the abuse of slaves become in this discourse more a problem 
of the misuse of power than of moral or ethical transgression. In the cultural 
program of sentimental reform, early reader periodicals like the Slave’s Friend 
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presented a curriculum in which the child was trained to feel—and to act, 
modeling Stowe’s classic formulation for the responsibilities of the sentimen-
tal activist. But the discourse of mastery and race and class privilege, which 
encouraged precisely the sort of paternalism that Stowe would be criticized 
for a generation later, was reinforced and naturalized along with children’s 
emerging abolitionist sentiment.
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